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Beatrice Weisman, then eighty-three years old, suffered a stroke.' Her
medical condition was such that she had to spend several weeks in the
hospital, eventually becoming incompetent to make medical decisions on her
own behalf.2 Luckily, she had prepared advance directives, naming her
husband William as the person responsible for making such decisions if and
when she became unable to do so herself. 3 William, taking into account the
wishes of the family, decided to formalize a do not resuscitate order: if
Beatrice entered cardiac arrest, she should be allowed to die.4 Upon finding
Beatrice in cardiac arrest, medical professionals instead resuscitated her,
breaking ribs and collapsing her lungs in the process.5 What is Beatrice to

1.
Paula Span, The Patients Were Saved. That's Why the Families Are Suing, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/health/wrongful-life-lawsuit-dnr
.html?mcubz=0.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
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do? Her wish, expressed through her family's knowledge and close personal
relationship with her, was to die. 6 This wish was overborne.
The major premise of Beatrice's claim, as with any other tort, is
essentially that she is in a worse position than she would have been had her
family's wishes for her been honored. The major point of friction comes in
acknowledging that in order for this premise to hold true, it must also be true
that Beatrice would have been better off dead. Shocking though it is, this
acknowledgement is at the heart of modem medical autonomy rights and is
required in order to vindicate these private rights through an appropriate
cause of action. Although Beatrice Weisman and patients in similar
situations have brought suit against medical professionals under theories
such as battery,' these torts do not capture the nature of the harm inflicted,
namely, prolonged life itself. Professor Oddi correctly asserts that the tort of
battery would obviously lie where a patient withholds consent to certain
treatments via a do not resuscitate order,8 but the right violated in such a
situation is not the right to be free from harmful or offensive contact-it is
the right of self-determination.
Fundamental to the concept of liberty, as announced by the Supreme
Court, is a patient's constitutional right to determine when, how, and even
whether to receive treatment. 9 States have ushered in vehicles, such as
durable powers of attorney, advance medical directives, and do not
resuscitate orders to help facilitate the exercise of that right. o But what is to
be done when health care providers fail to honor the dictates of those
vehicles? This Note argues that the oft-contentious "wrongful living" cause
of action should be recognized in South Carolina jurisprudence when a
patient is kept alive against her properly documented will.
In making this argument, it is helpful to concurrently analyze the more
robust body of law found in the "wrongful life" cause of action brought by
or on behalf of a disabled child, who claims that but for a medical

6.
Id.
7.
Id.; see also A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The
Wrongful Living Cause ofAction, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 649 (1986).
8.
Oddi, supra note 7, at 636.
9.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (announcing that "a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment. . . ."); see also Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.").
10. James Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 185 (1993); see
also S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 44-78-30

(2016) (do not resuscitate order); S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 44-77-

50 (1991) (declaration of a desire for a natural death).
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professional's negligence, he or she would not have been born." The same
injury lies at the base of both claims: life is an injury compared to death or
non-existence.12

A multitude of courts have disavowed a distinct cause of action for
wrongful life, with only four states allowing for recovery. 13 Generally,
courts rejecting the action reason that a wrongful life suit is not cognizable
primarily because (a) public policy mandates that life is not a legal injury,
and (b) the measure of damages is so ethereal as to be outside the realm of
legal determination.' 4 The Supreme Court of South Carolina has applied
both of these rationales in rejecting the wrongful life action," while the
District Court for the District of South Carolina rejected the damages
argument twenty-four years earlier, noting that policy considerations alone
precluded the action. 16
This Note highlights that the nation has experienced a large moral
attitude shift over the past several decades with respect to an individual right
to die or refuse treatment. '7 This, along with several other considerations
discussed below, should lead South Carolina courts to acknowledge that, in
some instances, a life lived with great suffering may be compensable when
the patient preferred their life to end."

&

11. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412 (1978) ("[A] cause of action
brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery for wrongful life demands a calculation of
damages dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired
state and nonexistence.").
12. See infra note 66.
13. W. Ryan Schuster, Rights Gone Wrong: A Case Against Wrongful Life, 57 WM.
MARY L. REV. 2329, 2330 (2016); see also Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tort Liabilityfor
Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978).
14. Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 157-58, 607 S.E.2d 63, 69 (2004) (summarizing
judicial sentiment surrounding wrongful life actions brought on behalf of infant).
15. Willis, 362 S.C. 146, 607 S.E.2d 63.
16. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 543 (1980) ("[T]he most potent
arguments, in this court opinion, against 'wrongful life' claims are predicated on public policy
considerations."); see also Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead Than Disabled?: Should Courts
Recognize a "Wrongful Living" Cause of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients'
Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149, 198-215 (arguing that the recognition of
a wrongful life cause of action will serve to disparage the physically and mentally disabled,
due to the implicit judicial recognition that life with a disability may not be worth living).
17. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); see also Milani,
supra note 16, at 163-64 (acknowledging that the "increase of assisted suicide cases and the
sheer number of right-to-die cases and statutes is not surprising given the fact that both public
opinion polls and scientific studies showed that many people prefer not to be placed on lifesupport systems").
18. See Oddi, supra note 7, at 637 ("Once it has been established that a person has the
right to die, medical personnel who might otherwise be under a duty to act on behalf of that
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Medical autonomy rights currently include the constitutional right to
refuse treatment resulting in death.19 Further, some states' respect for
citizens with terminal conditions has resulted in legislation that
accommodates actively hastening the process of death. 20 It is therefore
illogical for courts to continue to claim, "life, however impaired and
regardless of any attendant expenses, cannot rationally be said to be a
detriment." 2 1 The existence of do not resuscitate orders as an institution in
hospitals is itself evidence that individuals make the cost-benefit analysis of
life and death and often come to the opposite conclusion. 22 Violating a do
not resuscitate order also entails another type of harm: loss of bodily
autonomy itself regardless of the harm associated with continued life in an
impaired health state.
Part II of this Note will discuss several wrongful life and wrongful
living cases, and the similar policy and practicality concerns that have been
raised in both contexts that have led many courts to reject recognition. Part
III will discuss the relevant distinctions that exist between a claim for
wrongful life and a claim for wrongful living, and it will explore several
policy considerations surrounding the wrongful living cause of action.
Finally, Part IV will discuss the competency of jurors to determine
appropriate damages awards in an action for wrongful living, given the
widespread understanding in the United States that it is not necessarily a
benefit to be kept alive, as many decisions have urged.

person are not only relieved of that duty but also restrained by a diametrically opposite duty
not to interfere with that person's right to die.").
19. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
20. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 127.897
(2015) (Oregon Death with Dignity Act); LEGISLATIVE POLICY & RESEARCH OFFICE,
OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT BACKGROUND BRIEF (2016) [hereinafter ODWDA
BRIEF] (The brief notes that "[p]hysicians and families reported that patients have several
reasons for requesting the prescription medication under the Act. These include concerns about
losing autonomy, losing control of bodily fimctions, a decreasing ability to participate in
activities that make life enjoyable and physical suffering. Also, many family members added
that patients wanted to control the manner and time of their death.").
21. Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo. 1988) (child born with
hereditary blindness); see also Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d
225, 226 (Ohio 1996) (patient suffered a stroke after having been kept alive against his
expressed wishes).
22. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 197.
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JUDICIAL SENTIMENT REGARDING "WRONGFUL LIFE" AND "WRONGFUL
LIVING" CAUSES OF ACTION

As discussed above, the wrongful life and wrongful living causes of
action overlap in their reasoning behind the generalized statement that courts
are not equipped to decide these types of cases and neither are juries. 23
Because South Carolina has not yet had the occasion to decide a case
weighing the common law right to refuse unwanted medical treatment
against the application of life-sustaining measures, 24 it is useful to analyze
both bodies of law and then to distinguish the nature of each of these two
claims for recovery.
A.

Wrongful life and wrongful living cases from around the country

The first wrongful life suit was heard in 1963.25 In Zepeda v. Zepeda, a
claim was brought on behalf of an infant against his father. 26 The defendant
had induced the plaintiffs mother to conceive a child although he was
married to another woman; thus, the plaintiff was allegedly damaged for
having been born an "adulterine bastard." 27 Although ultimately rejecting
the wrongful life cause of action, leaving to the legislature the task of
resolving potentially vast social consequences in recognizing such an
action, 28 the court held that the plaintiff did in fact suffer an injury in being
born out of wedlock. 29 The court in Zepeda, however, appeared to exercise
its reticence with an open mind, stating that a more searching effort into the
social consequences of a wrongful life action must take place before it can
be maintained.30
Although Zepeda recognized that the plaintiff had indeed been injured
through another's wrongful acts resulting in an impaired life, this conclusion

23. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227, for an example of a court adopting the rationale
behind rejecting the wrongful life action in a wrongful living case.
24. 12 S.C. JUR. Death andRight to Die § 8 (2017).
25. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
26. Id. at 851.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 859.
29. Id. at 857-58 ("[I]t may be inconsistent to say, as we do, that the plaintiff has been
injured by a tortious act and then to question, as we do, his right to maintain an action to
recover for this act. This is done deliberately, however, because on the one hand, we believe
that the elements of a willful tort are presented by the allegations of the complaint and, on the
other hand, we approach with restraint the creation, by judicial sanction, of the new action
required by the complaint.").
30. Id. at 859 ("If we are to have a legal action for such a radical concept as wrongful
life, it should come after thorough study of the consequences.").
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is often wholly rejected by a number of other courts in both wrongful life
and wrongful living cases.
In Blake v. Cruz, the Idaho Supreme Court firmly rejected the wrongful
life cause of action brought on behalf of an impaired infant, reasoning that
life is not a compensable injury. 3' The plaintiff was born with various birth
defects as a result of the defendant's negligent failure to diagnose the
mother's rubella during pregnancy. 32 In rejecting the cause of action, the
court claimed that recognizing a wrongful life claim would "do violence" to
the purpose of law:
Basic to our culture is the precept that life is precious. As a society
[sic] therefore, our laws have as their driving force the purpose of
protecting, preserving and improving the quality of human
existence. To recognize wrongful life as a tort would do violence to
that purpose and is completely contradictory to the belief that life is
precious.33

The Blake court went further to say that even if the plaintiff had suffered
a legally cognizable harm by virtue of having been born with defects as a
result of the defendant's negligent acts, "the impossibility of measuring
damages would in any event preclude recognition of the cause of action." 34
The rationales expressed in Blake were mirrored in the wrongful living
case of Cronin v. Jamaica Hospital Medical Center.35 The plaintiffs
decedent had properly executed a do not resuscitate order, which was on file
with the hospital; nevertheless, the decedent was resuscitated against the
mandates of the directive on two separate occasions. 36 In affirming the grant
of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court reiterated the notion that the "decedent did not
sustain any legally cognizable injury as a result of the defendant's conduct"
37
in keeping the patient alive.
Similarly, in Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, the Court of
Appeals of Ohio held that "life is not a compensable harm; therefore, there is

31. Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (Idaho 1984).
32. Id at 3 16.
33. Id. at 322 (quoted in Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 158, 607 S.E.2d 63, 69 (2004)).
34. Blake, 698 P.2d at 322.
35. Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 60 A.D.3d 803, 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
(noting the lack of "any legally cognizable injury").
36. Id. at 803.
37. Id. at 804.
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no cause of action for wrongful living." 38 The decedent in Anderson had a
"no code blue" directive placed in his medical chart while in the hospital for
chest pain.39 Upon suffering a ventricular fibrillation, the decedent's nurse
ignored the "no code blue" order and resuscitated the decedent with a
defibrillator. 40 Although the court found evidence that the decedent
"expressly refused treatment in a code-blue situation," 41 the court rejected
the wrongful living claim on the basis that the decedent suffered no injury by
being kept alive against his will, citing the rule of the Ohio Supreme Court
in the prior decision of Bowman v. Davis that a lack of life cannot be a legal
benefit. 42

Interestingly, on appeal the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the
plaintiff could recover, yet only under a theory of negligence or battery. 43
The court nevertheless echoed Professor Oddi's argument for recognition of
a distinct cause of action for wrongful living: "Because a person has a right
to die, a medical professional who has been trained to preserve life, and who
has taken an oath to do so, is relieved of that duty and is required by a legal
duty to accede to a patient's express refusal of medical treatment." 44 The
court in Anderson still managed to prevent any meaningful recovery for the
patient's suffering by way of attacking causation through an intervening
circumstance. Although the stroke may have been a foreseeable result of
resuscitating the patient, the nurse merely caused him to survive a
ventricular fibrillation. 45

New Jersey has also refused to recognize the wrongful life action
brought on behalf of a disabled child. 46 In Berman v. Allan, the court
emphasized that the difficulty in measuring damages, although not in and of
itself sufficient justification for the court's refusal to recognize the action,
played a role. 47 The Berman court also echoed prior wrongful life decisions

38. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992).
39. Id. at 843.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 844.
42. Id. at 845-46 (citing Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496, 498-99 (Ohio 1976)).
43. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio 1996).
44. Id. at 227.
45. Id. at 228.
46. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979).
47. Id. (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967)) ("In the case of
a claim predicated upon wrongful life, such a computation would require the trier of fact to
measure the difference in value between life in an impaired condition and the 'utter void of
nonexistence.' Such an endeavor, however, is literally impossible.").
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and predicated its opinion on the position that life is not a legally cognizable
harm. 48

B.

The South Carolinawrongful life decisions of Phillips and Willis

Although there are no South Carolina cases in the wrongful living
context, South Carolina has had occasion to consider the issue of wrongful
life lawsuits brought on behalf of a disabled child in two instances. 49 The
concepts expressed in the following opinions explore substantially similar
questions of policy and practicality that are faced in the case of a do not
resuscitate order violation. As such, they provide insight towards predicting
the posture of South Carolina state courts when the time comes to hear a
wrongful living claim.
In the first of these cases, Phillips v. United States, the District Court for
the District of South Carolina granted partial summary judgment to the
United States on the claim of "wrongful life" in a Section 198350 suit
brought on behalf of a child with Down syndrome. 5 ' As an issue of first
impression in South Carolina, the district court predicted what the Supreme
Court of South Carolina would have decided and followed that projected
reasoning. 52 The court was not persuaded by the fact that damages in a
wrongful life action would be inherently difficult to measure, noting that
"damages arguments are 'more a matter of policy than logic."'

53

The

Phillips court recited the United States Supreme Court's position while
addressing this issue: "If a claim is legally cognizable, mere difficulty in the
ascertainment of damages should be insufficient to preclude the action." 54
Although the difficulty in measuring damages was of primary concern
to the courts in cases like Blake and Berman, the court in Phillips recognized

48. Id. at 11-12.
49. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980); Willis v. Wu, 362
S.C. 146, 607 S.E.2d 63 (2004).
50. Phillips was heard in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), providing
federal jurisdiction for claims against federal government employees such as the Charleston
Naval installation staff. Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at 538.
51. Id. at 544.
52. Id. at 540.
53. Id. at 542 (quoting Alexander Morgan Capron, Tort Liability and Genetic
Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618, 648 (1979)); see also id. at 543 n.12 (discussing the
irony of the artificial and speculative damage analysis required in diethylstilbestrol (DES) birth
defect litigation: the condition the child would have been in but for the prescription of DES
could be non-existence, because DES is prescribed to mothers to prevent spontaneous abortion
in high-risk mothers).
54. Id. at 542 (citing Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555, 563 (1931)).
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that the primary justification for rejecting the wrongful life action was based
in public policy. " In summarizing the policy considerations of wrongful life
precedent in other states, the court concluded that the wrongful life action
stood inapposite to the fundamental policy of promoting the "preciousness
and sanctity of human life." 5 6 The court appeared to leave the door open to
recognizing such a claim in the future, however, noting that moral attitude
shifts could provide a new perspective from which to analyze the issue. 1
In Willis v. Wu, the Supreme Court of South Carolina nodded to the
Phillips court for correctly predicting that a wrongful life claim would not be
cognizable in the state.5 8 However, the Willis court diverged from the
Phillips opinion by stating that apart from the policy considerations, the
difficulty in measuring damages would also be dispositive. "[A] jury
necessarily would face an imponderable question: Is a severely impaired life
so much worse than no life at all that [the plaintiff] is entitled to
damages?" 59 The court summarized this hurdle as follows:
Our civil justice system places inestimable faith in the ability of
jurors to reach a fair and just result under the law, but even a jury
collectively imbued with the wisdom of Solomon would be unable
to weigh the fact of being born with a defective condition against
the fact of not being born at all, i.e., non-existence. It is simply
beyond the human experience. 60
The Willis court did, however, acknowledge the temporal nature of the
policy considerations as they were discussed in Phillips. Moral attitude shifts
may provide a new perspective from which to analyze the issue. 61
The general consensus across the courts is thus to decline recognition of
the cause of action for both wrongful life and wrongful living. The stated
reasons for doing so, as the South Carolina courts noted in Phillips and
Willis, are based either on the premise that life itself, in whatever form lived,
cannot be recognized as a legal harm for various policy reasons, or that the
measure of damages in such a case would simply require too much from a
jury.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 543.
Id.
Id.
Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 156, 607 S.E.2d 63, 67 (2004).
Id. at 162, 607 S.E.2d at 71.
Id.
Id.
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These premises, however, stand in dissonance with the right to refuse
treatment: how can a right exist when the citizen in possession of that right
has no recourse when the right is violated?62 The conclusory statement that
public policy mandates rejection of the cause of action leaves much room for
debate.
Further, the conclusion that difficulty in determining the appropriate
measure of damages is grounds for rejecting the action is founded upon an
inherently flawed premise. This conclusion is not only in stark opposition to
tort law's historical trust in jurors63 but also to the United States Supreme
Court's rule, set forth in Story Parchment Co. v. PatersonParchmentPaper
Co. and cited by the District Court for the District of South Carolina in
Phillips: "Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the
ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a
perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the
injured person."64
III. SOUTH CAROLINA SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ADOPT THE TORT OF
WRONGFUL LIVING WHEN MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS VIOLATE A Do
NOT RESUSCITATE ORDER

As discussed above, a majority of courts considering the questions
posed by wrongful life actions have responded by rejecting the validity of
the claim.65 Similarly, courts faced with a wrongful living cause of action
have rejected the claim for many of the same reasons as those stated in the
wrongful life context.66 A thesis of this Note is that the adoption of
reasoning from wrongful life cases in a wrongful living action is misplaced.
Wrongful living plaintiffs are fundamentally different in that they have
attempted to exercise their right of self-determination in refusing treatment.
To the contrary, as the Becker court astutely noted in that wrongful life case,

62. See Oddi, supra note 7, at 637 (discussing a presumed duty of medical professionals
not to interfere with the right to refuse treatment).
63. See Willis, 362 S.C. at 162, 607 S.E.2d at 71 (discussing how the "civil justice
system places inestimable faith in the ability of jurors," yet drawing a line and concluding that
jurors are incapable of reaching a fair and just result in a wrongful life action).
64. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)
(emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 544 (D.S.C. 1980).
66. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio
1996) (reconciling the wrongful living action with the wrongful life action and concluding that
"[s]ome form of valuation of life pervades the legal issue" surrounding these claims).
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there is no recognized right not to be born, even into a life of suffering and
hardship.

67

Notwithstanding the recitals in the South Carolina cases of Phillips and
Willis, and the conclusions by many courts that (a) life is not a cognizable
harm by virtue of public policy, and (b) the difficulty in measuring damages
precludes an action where the harm may properly be characterized as life
itself,68 this Note seeks to probe the weaknesses of both premises as applied
to wrongful living actions. In addition, this Note will attempt to distinguish
the wrongful life cause of action from the wrongful living cause of action
with the hope that a proper civil remedy may be afforded to individuals
whose right of self-determination has been violated. The remedy for
violating a patient's right of self-determination should properly meet the
nature of the harm, as opposed to affording recovery within the limited
causal scope of battery as was the case in Anderson.69
A.

The individual right to refuse treatment, once established, is an
exception to the state's interest in preserving human life: the
latter should therefore not be used to delimit the former under
the guise ofpublic policy

The Supreme Court in Cruzan said that the state has an "unqualified
interest" in the preservation of human life. 70 The interest is, however, quite
qualified in context. The nature of the state's "unqualified interest" in the
preservation of human life is limited by the facts of Cruzan, a situation in
which the veracity of the patient's wish to refuse treatment was in
question. 7 ' The state's interest in preserving human life presumably may
not, therefore, be asserted to overcome the wishes of a patient who has
properly recorded do not resuscitate orders or other advance directives. 72
Courts refusing to recognize wrongful living claims are in effect curtailing

67. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting in part).
68. See e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (finding that the difficulty in
measuring damages and the non-recognition of life as a legally cognizable harm precluded the
wrongful life action).
69. See, e.g., Tucker v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 709, 711 (D. Md. 1973) ("The
fundamental goal of tort recovery is compensation of the victim, i.e., to put the victim, insofar
as money damages may do so, in the position he would have been absent the tort.").
70. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990).
71. See id. at 338-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("An innocent person's constitutional right
to be free from unwanted medical treatment is . . . limited to those patients who had the
foresight to make an unambiguous statement of their wishes while competent.").
72. See id. at 281-82.
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the constitutional right to refuse treatment by disallowing any recovery for a
violation of that right.
The thrust of Cruzan is that a state may "safeguard the personal element
of [the choice to refuse treatment] through the imposition of heightened
evidentiary requirements," 73 while affirming that individuals have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to refuse treatment. 74
The state's interest in promoting the value of human life, therefore, is
entirely inapplicable to wrongful living torts under Cruzan so long as the
patient's advance medical directives or do not resuscitate orders are properly
executed. What is the public policy furthered by the courts in refusing to
recognize the wrongful living cause of action? How can life categorically
fail to be a legal injury, when the United States Supreme Court has declared
that individuals have a constitutional right to refuse treatment resulting in
death?75 Such a conclusion overlooks the fact that many Americans have
weighed the costs and benefits of receiving life-saving treatment and thought
otherwise. 76

1.

The state interest in preserving human life is not undercut by
recognizing the wrongful living cause of action, assuming the
execution of a do not resuscitate order was carried out in
accordancewithin the applicableSouth Carolinastatutes

Exercising the right to refuse treatment is inherently personal, and the
existence of the right to refuse treatment that may result in death is an
acknowledgement that each individual may decide for themselves when life
is no longer worth living. Although the state has an interest in preserving
human life,7 7 this interest is properly served by the conditions placed by
statute on executing a do not resuscitate order.78 The detriment caused by
saving a person who wished to die should therefore be considered a legal
injury, because all policy concerns of the state may be taken into account
during the process of executing an order.

73. Id at 281.
74. Id.
75. See Oddi, supra note 7, at 632-35, for a discussion of the state's permissible interest
in preserving life.
76. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 197.
77. See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 7, at 632-35.
78. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-20(A)(2016) (setting forth the conditions precedent to
proper execution of a do not resuscitate order and integrating the provisions of the Adult
Healthcare Consent Act in the case of surrogate execution).
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Professor Oddi compares the weight of individual and state interests at
play in this situation: "The notion that the individual exists for the good of
the state is, of course, antithetical to our fundamental thesis that the role of
the state is to insure a maximum of individual freedom of choice and
conduct." 79 Maximizing individual freedom of choice and conduct entails
allowing recovery for wrongful living, because the counterbalancing state
interest in preserving human life is already taken into account in the
appropriate living will statutes. Allowing recovery will serve to bolster the
freedom of choice already embodied in South Carolina's end of life
treatment statutes.80
There seems to be no remaining policy justification that a South
Carolina court may set forth to preclude a wrongful living claim, when the
legislature appears to have taken all relevant policy concerns into
consideration in passing the do not resuscitate order statutes.
B.

The wrongful life tort is premised on vindicating the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, not a notion that disabled or
otherwise impaired lives are less valuable

Although it is necessary to acknowledge that a wrongful living plaintiff
is arguing that death would have been more valuable than living in their
impaired state, it is improper to extend this acknowledgement to third parties
as a whole.
Executing a do not resuscitate order is a fundamentally personal
decision based on a difficult cost-benefit analysis." Acknowledging the
rights of individuals to come to the conclusion that they do not want
resuscitative treatment is in no way an expression that disabled persons'
lives are less valuable in the aggregate sense. Professor Adam Milani argues
that the wrongful living tort, in addition to the Cruzan decision, reflects a
societal prejudice that disavows and devalues the lives of persons living with
disabilities.82 The Supreme Court of California acknowledged, in the
wrongful life case of Turpin v. Sortini, the potential for absurdity in this line
of reasoning:

79. Oddi, supra note 7, at 632-33 (quoting In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 n.5 (D.C.
1972) (emphasis added).
80. Compare Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (Idaho 1984) ("As a society [sic]
therefore, our laws have as their driving force the purpose of protecting, preserving and
improving the quality of human existence."), with Osborne, 294 A.2d at 375 n.5 (arguing that
maximization of freedom of choice and conduct should be a driving force of state policies).
81. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
82. See Milani, supra note 16, at 198.
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Although it is easy to understand and to endorse these decisions'
desire to affirm the worth and sanctity of less-than-perfect life, we
question whether these considerations alone provide a sound basis
for rejecting the child's tort action. To begin with, it is hard to see
how an award of damages to a severely handicappedor suffering
child would "disavow" the value of lfe or in any way suggest that
the child is not entitled to the full measure of legal and nonlegal
rights and privileges accorded to all members of society.83
The Turpin court held that there was no basis in the law for concluding
that, in all instances, an impaired life was always preferable to non-life.8 4
The court supported its position by reference to the California Health and
Safety Code," which reaffirmed that patients have the right to refuse
treatment, in part because treatment may sometimes rob the patient of
dignity or otherwise be a source of pain and suffering while providing
nothing of medical benefit.86
Professor Milani nonetheless asserts that both the wrongful living tort
and the Cruzan decision sanction the notion that an impaired life is worth
less than no life and are detrimental to the esteem of disabled people." This
argument is still flawed on two counts. First, as Cruzan indicated, exercising
the right to die is a "deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming
finality."" It is exactly the personal nature of the decision that prevents
prejudice to the disabled, regardless of what assumptions must be made in
awarding a wrongful life plaintiff a damages award. If we as a society
awarded Beatrice Weisman a damages award for wrongful life, 8 9 it would
not be premised on the principle that people with collapsed lungs and broken
ribs would be better off dead in the aggregate. Rather, she should be
awarded damages because she possessed and attempted to exercise a right of
self-determination, which was thwarted.
Second, it flows from Professor Milani's argument that if both the
wrongful living tort and the Cruzan decision prejudice the disabled, the fact

83. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 954 (Cal. 1982) (emphasis added).
84. See id.
85. See id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West) (repealed 2000)).
86. Compare Turpin, 643 P.2d at 954, with S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-15(2) (2016)
(."Do not resuscitate order for emergency services' means a document made pursuant to this
article to prevent EMS personnel from employing resuscitative measures or any other medical
process that would only extend the patient's suffering with no viable medical reason to
perform the procedure.").
87. See Milani, supra note 16, at 198.
88. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (emphasis added).
89. See Span, supra note 1.
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that Cruzan and the rights established by it are still the law in this country is
justification enough for recognition of the wrongful living cause of action:
The United States Supreme Court has already passed on the interests at stake
and responded in the affirmative with respect to whether patients in dire
straits may determine their fate if the proper procedure has been followed.90
The existence of a legal right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is
inseparable from a remedy for the violation of that right.
C. A large percentage of the population would not want life-saving
treatment in various hypothetical circumstances. The public is
keenly aware that life is not alwayspreferable to death
South Carolina will hopefully be reluctant to accept the public policy
rationale present in both the wrongful life and wrongful living cases
discussed above when wrongful living arrives in South Carolina: that an
action premised on life as an injury does violence to the policy of promoting
the value of human life. This rationale is asserted at face value by many
courts and is countervailed by extensive data regarding American citizens'
end-of-life treatment preferences. 91
A primary function of the judiciary is to protect political minorities,
such as the disabled, from the driving forces of the popular majority. 92 If, as
discussed above, disabled people are not disparaged by recognition of a
wrongful living cause of action as argued by Professor Milani, then the
public policy justification for rejecting the cause of action would only lie if it
was perverse to the political majority's view. 93 Does the public actually
believe that recognizing a cause of action in which death necessarily must be
valued higher than life does violence to the sanctity and value of life itself?
Perhaps part of the sanctity and value of life lies in the ability of a person to
make decisions that will ensure that their life is lived in a dignified fashion,
and on their own terms.
There is significant evidence that a majority of the population would not
want to be kept alive in certain hypothetical circumstances and presumably
would exercise their right to refuse treatment given the chance. 94 Professor

90. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
91. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 197.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
93. A policy interest could not conceivably be found where neither the majority nor the
minority of any given classification is benefited.
94. Lindgren, supra note 10, at 197 (reviewing over 200 national opinion poll questions
and concluding that the majority of Americans would prefer not to be kept alive if on life
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Lindgren argues that, in accordance with the majority view on end-of-life
procedures, better health care policy would be to set the default rule
essentially in line with the strictures of a do not resuscitate order, and that
patients should have to opt in to receive the aggressive life-saving measures
employed in the modem age.95
As evidenced by the studies compiled by Professor Lindgren, sentiment
regarding aggressive life-saving measures is not positive in every setting,
and a majority of the sample population would assert their right to refuse
treatment in various settings where very low quality of life or severe pain
would otherwise result. 96 This sentiment has clearly manifested itself in the
form of legislation allowing for the facilitation of those rights throughout the
country, including South Carolina. 97
Rights of patients-the majority of patients-should not be overborne
by a vaguely-grounded proposition that vindicating that right head-on in a
wrongful living claim would do violence to the purpose of law. 98 Surely, the
South Carolina legislature's enactment of tools to facilitate those rights is
evidence enough of the policy, law, rights, and duties to which the courts
should adhere.
D. South Carolinamedical professionals are under a duty to honor do
not resuscitateorders, and liabilityfor a breach of that duty should
naturallyfollow
The South Carolina legislature has already taken steps to ensure that the
rights of patients are honored when a do not resuscitate order has been
properly executed.99 A patient in South Carolina may direct their health care
provider to execute a do not resuscitate order if they have a "terminal

support systems or in a coma, or even if an irreversible condition would cause "a great deal of
physical pain").
95. Compare Lindgren, supra note 10, at 186 ("If the patient's wishes are unknown,
follow the course that most people would want for themselves in desperate end-of-life
situations-a withdrawal of treatment to allow an earlier death."), with Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
263 (1990) (discussing the irreparable harm associated with an erroneous decision to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment, and contrasting the remediable harm associated with the continuance
of treatment against the patient's wishes).
96. Lindgren, supra note 10, at 197.
97. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-30 (2016).
98. Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (Idaho 1984); Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 158,
607 S.E.2d 63, 69 (2004).
99. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-10 to -65 (2016).
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condition."' Health care providers and emergency medical services
personnel "must not provide resuscitative measures" when the patient has
executed a do not resuscitate order or is wearing a do not resuscitate
bracelet. 101 If, for presumably personal reasons, a medical service provider
"cannot honor the order," they are directed to transfer the patient to a service
provider who will honor the order.' 02 The statute notably carves out several
exceptions to civil and criminal liability for medical service professionals in
the do not resuscitate process.103 Most importantly with respect to the
wrongful living tort is the following:
No health care provider or EMS personnel is liable for damages,
may be the subject of disciplinary proceedings, or may be subject to
civil or criminal liability due to .

.

. initiating resuscitative treatment

on a "do not resuscitate patient" if EMS personnel were unaware of
the existence of the order or bracelet or if EMS personnel
reasonably and in good faith believed the "do not resuscitate order"
had been canceled or revoked or, where applicable, if the do not
resuscitate bracelet has been tampered with or removed. 104
Given the explicit exceptions from liability in the enumerated and finite
circumstances described above, a proper inference may be made'o that if
EMS personnel (a) were aware of the existence of the do not resuscitate
order; (b) did not have a good faith belief that the do not resuscitate order
was cancelled or revoked; and (c) the do not resuscitate bracelet, if present,
was not tampered with or removed, then civil liability may lie if resuscitative
06
measures are employed.1

100. See id § 44-78-20(A) (2016); id § 44-78-15(7) (defining terminal condition as "an
incurable or irreversible condition that within reasonable medical judgment could cause death
within a reasonably short period of time if life-sustaining procedures are not used").
101. Id. § 44-78-45(A); see also id. § 44-78-30(B) (do not resuscitate bracelet).
102. Id § 44-78-45(B).
103. Id § 44-78-35.
104. Id § 44-78-35(3); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-70-90 (2015) (providing similar
exceptions to liability under the South Carolina Death With Dignity Act); see also id. § 15-32230(A) ("[I]n a genuine emergency situation involving an immediate threat of death or serious
bodily injury to the patient receiving care in an emergency department or in an obstetrical or
surgical suite, no physician may be held liable unless it is proven that the physician was
grossly negligent.").
105. The exceptions to liability under section 44-78-35 are presumably exhaustive under
the statutory construction principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
106. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-35 (2016); see also Oddi, supra note 7, at 636 ("[I]f a
person has a right to die by refusing to consent to medical treatment, correlatively one would
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This inference fails to answer the question of under what theory a
patient whose do not resuscitate order was violated may recover, in light of
the South Carolina decisions in Phillips and Willis. First principles of tort
theory provide an answer. 0 7 The cause of action must provide a remedy that
captures the injury inflicted. In a wrongful living tort, the patient wished to
exercise their right to refuse treatment and was thwarted by a medical
professional. In that patient's mind, it can be assumed that a cost-benefit
analysis was made, and that the patient decided that dying was more
valuable than continued life resulting from a "process that would only
extend the patient's suffering." 08 The appropriate remedy for the violation
of a do not resuscitate order is to allow the civil justice system to capture this
ephemeral analysis and put those patients, in monetary terms, in the position
they would have wanted to be in but for the tort.
E.

The existence of a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment
necessitates a remedy at lawfor the violation of that right

The Supreme Court of the United States and the South Carolina
legislature, as discussed above, have both acted to establish a competent,
terminally ill person's right to refuse treatment, even if death will occur.109
The establishment of this right is eroded towards nothingness without a
direct and appropriate remedy.
The seminal case of Marbury v. Madison stands for the same
proposition: the existence of a right is sufficient in and of itself to recognize
a remedy at law for its violation.11 0 The United States Supreme Court
recognized in Marbury that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
afford that protection.""' Given the pervasive and accepted existence of a
right to refuse treatment when certain prerequisites are satisfied, it follows
that patients should be able to recover for wrongful living when their
expressed desire to perish naturally is overborne. "[I]t is a general and

be under a duty not to provide that treatment, and there would be consequences in tort for so
treating.").
107. See, e.g., Tucker v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 709, 711 (D. Md. 1973)
(discussing the fimdamental goal of tort law as the vehicle by which a plaintiff is made whole
by compensation that would put the plaintiff in the position they would be in but for the
commission of the tort).
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-15(2) (2016).
109. Id. § 44-78-45; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 338-39 (1990).
110. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
111. Id.
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indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded."1 2 The
Court in Marbury reiterated that the government of the United States is one
of laws, not of men, and warned that this high calling will go unanswered "if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."" 3 This
is an appropriate standard by which the efficacy of civil remedies should be
evaluated, and the current justifications given for rejecting the cause of
action for wrongful living are unpersuasive in light of the principles laid
forth in Marbury.
F.

The wrongful living tort is a necessary deterrent that will ensure
that health care providers honor the dictates of their patients' endof-lfe wishes

Correlative to the role of courts in providing compensation to those who
have suffered legal injuries is the court's role in establishing deterrents
against the undesirable behavior that gives rise to such injuries. In the case
of willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the mandates of a patient's do
not resuscitate order, punitive damages ought to be available to future
wrongful living plaintiffs in order to deter the health care industry as a whole
from disregarding patients' wishes.1 4
It is important to recognize that several factors are present that
incentivize health care providers to engage in aggressive life-saving
treatment against the terms of a patient's do not resuscitate order. First,
medical professionals are indoctrinated to adhere to a default rule of
aggressive life-saving treatment from the outset of their training" :
[F]rom medical school on, from their mentors' and their patients'
expectations, their instincts are well trained to intervene to prolong
life. Indeed, physicians are rarely challenged for intervening but
often criticized for going slow. Physicians do not easily accept the
conception that it may be best to do less, not more, for a patient.116

112. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23 (1783)).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 379, 529 S.E.2d 528, 533 (2000) (noting
that punitive damages compensate the plaintiff for the willful violation of private rights, and
serve to deter similar future conduct by providing a warning to others).
115. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 186-87.
116. EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE 91 (1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Thus, although doctors may be presumed aware of the doctrine of
informed consent, withholding treatment that might save a patient's life is
likely counterintuitive for many.
Second, and more ominously, researchers at Stanford University suggest
that health care institutions have a financial incentive to provide life-saving
treatment, especially in the common fee-for-services regime, regardless of
the patient's wishes. 117 "The current fiscal system rewards hospitals and
doctors for medical procedures and providing high intensity care to
terminally ill persons," and does not "reimburse . . . conversations that elicit
values and goals of care and what matters most to patients . . . at the end of

life.""
Recognition of the tort of wrongful living is an appropriate method by
which to counterbalance these forces in an effort to bring effect to patients'
rights and wishes.
IV.

THE DIFFICULTY IN MEASURING DAMAGES SHOULD
RECOGNITION OF THE TORT OF WRONGFUL LIVING

NOT

BAR

The attendant difficulty in measuring damages that occur in a claim for
wrongful living should not serve to preclude recovery for a violation of a
patient's autonomy rights. While it is true that a claim for wrongful life and
a claim for wrongful living both require some measure of the valuation of
human life compared to a lack thereof," 9 this Note contends that it is a
stretch too far to deem jurors incompetent to take on this task insofar as
wrongful living claims are concerned.
A.

The United States Supreme Court has admonished the argument
that dfficulty in measuringdamages shouldpreclude recovery

As discussed above, several courts have premised their rejection of
wrongful life and wrongful living claims partly on the contention that the
amount of damages suffered by the complaining party are too ethereal to
measure with any degree of certainty.1 20 This line of reasoning was rejected

117. See Vyjeyanthi S. Periyakoil et al., Do Unto Others: Doctors' PersonalEnd-of-Life
Resuscitation Preferences and Their Attitudes Toward Advance Directives, PLOS One, May

28, 2014, at 8, http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0098246&
type=printable.

118. Id.
119. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996).
120. Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 162, 607 S.E.2d 63, 71 (2004).
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by Phillips,121 but was later adopted by Willis, and is therefore likely to be a
large point of friction when South Carolina hears its first wrongful living
suit.
In Story Parchment, cited by Phillips, the United States Supreme Court
set forth its position on the matter.1 22 Story Parchment was an action to
recover damages caused by a price-fixing scheme in violation of the
Sherman Act.1 23 The trial court submitted to the jury the question of
damages, to include, among other things, the difference between the amount
realized by the plaintiff and the amount it would have realized but for the
unlawful price-fixing conspiracy of the defendants.1 24 The First Circuit held
that no recovery could be had on this item of damages, in part because the
jury would necessarily be relying on speculation and conjecture.1 25 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Sutherland
emphatically rejected this principle on behalf of a unanimous Court.126
The Story Parchment opinion concluded that some amount of damages,
though they may only be approximate in nature, are recoverable so long as
the damage itself can be shown to be the result of another's wrongful act.1 27
Two primary justifications were given. First, a wrongdoer should not be
entitled to complain that no recovery should result on the basis of
uncertainty when the uncertainty is caused by the wrongful act.1 28 Citing the
Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Allison v. Chandler, the United
States Supreme Court declared that the risk of uncertainty justifiably lives
with the wrongdoer and not the injured party.1 29 Second, the Story
Parchment court noted that jurors are the appropriate arbiters of admittedly
uncertain measures of damages:
Juries are allowed to act upon probable and inferential as well as
direct and positive proof. And when, from the nature of the case, the
amount of the damages can not be estimated with certainty, or only
a part of them can be so estimated, we can see no objection to
placing before the jury all the facts and circumstances of the case,

121. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542 (D.S.C. 1980).
122. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
123. Id. at 566.
124. Id. at 561.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 564-65.
127. Id. at 565 (quoting Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, 131 (1871)) (describing a rule
that denies recovery to a party who has been injured by a wrongful act due to uncertain
damages as "little less than legalized robbery").
128. See id. at 563.
129. Id. (citing Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 550-56 (1863)).
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having any tendency to show damages, or their probable amount; so
as to enable them to make the most intelligible and probable
estimate which the nature of the case will permit.13 0
The Court then unequivocally stated that where a wrongful act
necessarily gives rise to an injury that cannot be measured easily in
monetary terms, "it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of
justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the
wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts."131
As noted above, the Phillips court adopted Story Parchment'sreasoning
in that South Carolina wrongful life suit. 132 Willis, however, still refused to
allow the cause of action for wrongful life to proceed, based in part on the
assumption that jurors are incapable of understanding the value of never
having been born.1 33 Hopefully, future wrongful living plaintiffs in South
Carolina will take solace in the stark and important difference between the
Willis wrongful life suit and their pending wrongful living claim: while no
juror can claim to know what it is like to never have been born, Professor
Lindgren's studies suggest that a healthy cross-section of South Carolinians
understand the deeply personal nature of a formal decision to refuse
treatment and the violence to dignity associated with a wrongful living cause
of action. Jurors are thus more likely to be able to associate a value to a
wrongful living plaintiffs injuries with more certainty than they might in a
wrongful life claim.
South Carolina jurisprudence nevertheless recognizes that "damages
must be susceptible of ascertainment with a reasonable degree of certainty,
and that uncertain, contingent, or speculative damages cannot be
recovered ... ..134 However, case law applying this principle should not
serve as a bar to recovery for wrongful living.
In United Merchants & Manufacturers v. South CarolinaElectric and
Gas Co., the District Court for the Western District of South Carolina
precluded recovery on the basis of the claim's speculation-prone
damages. 13 In the claim for fraud and deceit, the plaintiff claimed that they
were wrongfully deprived of their incentive to argue against a utility rate
increase before the South Carolina Public Service Commission as a result of

130. Id. at 564 (quoting Allison, 11 Mich. at 555).
131. Id. at 563.
132. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542 (D.S.C. 1980).
133. Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 162, 607 S.E.2d 63, 71 (2004).
134. United Merchants & Mfrs. v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 113 F. Supp. 257, 261
(W.D.S.C.), aff'd, 208 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1953); 11 S.C. JUR. Damages § 5 (2017).
135. UnitedMerchants, 113 F. Supp. at 261.
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the defendant's representations.1 36 Damages allegedly amounted to the
difference between the rate at which the commission fixed and the plaintiff
was required to pay, and the rate at which the commission would have fixed
prices if the plaintiff had retained its incentive to argue before the
commission.1 37 While the court stated that damages must be susceptible to
ascertainment with a "reasonable degree of certainty,"1 38 the issue was
whether the plaintiff could prove that the rate would have been fixed at a
lower price but for the withdrawal of its objections to the rate increase. 139
"There is no showing in the complaint to indicate that a different conclusion
would have been reached by the [c]ommission if the plaintiff had not
withdrawn its appearance."' 40 Thus, the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently
allege a probability of proximately caused damages whatsoever.
While the court in United Merchants set forth principles of recovery that
seem to favor rejection of a wrongful living claim in the future because
damages may not pass muster within the "reasonable degree of certainty"
language, the facts of United Merchants align more squarely with the law of
causation: the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that its withdrawal from
rate increase hearings was a causal factor in the resulting increased utility
rates it ultimately had to pay.141
In a wrongful living claim, the injury sustained that from which
damages flow is the violation of an established right, a situation where
damages are awarded quite often.1 42 The measure of damages is not
uncertain with respect to probability, but rather due to the admittedly
difficult cost-benefit analysis that jurors must undertake in evaluating the
degree of harm suffered by the plaintiff. Unlike United Merchants, where
damages were claimed based on the speculative proposition that injury might
have been avoided but for a wrongful act, a wrongful living claim alleges
damages due to a direct violation of the patient's rights. A jury need not
undertake a probability analysis of whether some act affected the chain of
events with enough likelihood to give rise to a damages award as they might
have in United Merchants.

136. Id. at 259.
137. See id. at 261.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807, 810-11 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) ("[C]onstitutional rights of a citizen are so valuable to him that an injury is
presumed to flow from the deprivation itself."); see also Note, Measuring Damages for
Violations of Individuals' Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 358-62 (1974)
(discussing the development of standards for measuring damages in § 1983 suits).
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South Carolina should accordingly adopt the reasoning in Story
Parchmentand Phillips: a jury should be able to hear the facts of a wrongful
living claim and then be allowed to carry out its duty "to make the most
intelligible and probable estimate which the nature of the case will
permit."143
B. Damages could easily be measured based on the continued
suffering that the patientpresumably wished to avoid while deciding
to execute a do not resuscitateorder
A South Carolina statute lays bare the fact that, in certain circumstances,
life-saving measures do nothing but prolong suffering and are not supported
by any viable medical reason.1 44
The measurement of damages in a wrongful living case, although they
may require an evaluation of the value of human life, are not nearly as
difficult to gauge as they are in an action for wrongful life, and wrongful life
decisions should be distinguished.1 45 The pain and suffering of continued
life after violation of a do not resuscitate order should be considered a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of resuscitating a patient who has
executed a do not resuscitate order. 146 Death is a process, and resuscitating a
patient who has a do not resuscitate order alters that process in a direct
causal fashion: it extends the patient's suffering, as evidenced by a South
Carolina statute.1 47

Consider a survival action for wrongful death. It is a well-established
rule in South Carolina jurisprudence that the representative of a decedent's
estate may recover for the conscious pain and suffering that the decedent
experienced prior to death, as long as the defendant proximately caused that
pain and suffering.1 48 The principle underlying wrongful death recovery of
this type may be extended to encompass wrongful living recovery in a

143. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 564 (1931)
(quoting Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 555 (1863)).
144. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-15(2) (2016).
145. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28 (1967) (noting that jurors cannot comprehend
the utter void of nonexistence in relation to a claim for wrongful life).
146. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-15(2) (2016) (defining a do not resuscitate order as a
vehicle by which patients may avoid procedures that would "only extend the patient's suffering
with no viable medical reason to perform the procedure") (emphasis added); see also
ODWDA BRIEF, supra note 20, at 2 (noting that avoidance of continued physical suffering is
one of the many reasons patients wish their life to end).
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-15(2) (2016).
148. See, e.g., Rutland v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 400 S.C. 209, 213-15, 734 S.E.2d 142,
144-45 (2012).
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manner that juries are accustomed to. Citizens have a right to be free from
conscious pain and suffering caused by another's wrongful acts, and the duty
of medical professionals to honor the dictates of a do not resuscitate order
establishes that failure to do so should be considered wrongful.1 49
When resuscitative measures are rendered against a patient's expressed
will, their conscious pain and suffering thereafter should then be recoverable
up until the time the patient was expected to die, or in the case of a survival
action, did in fact die. 15

This theory of damages would probably prove to be quite workable
given that patients may only execute a do not resuscitate order if they have
an incurable or irreversible condition that within reasonable medical
judgment could cause death within a reasonably short period of time.'' The
scope of proximate cause could be limited by the use of experts and prior
diagnoses to determine how long the patient is expected to live in their
terminal condition,' 52 similar to the methods used in wrongful death actions.
C. South Carolina recognizes that tort law places "inestimablefaith"
in the ability ofjurors to associate an appropriatedamages award
to a plaintiffclaiming noneconomic damages
Tort law is already riddled with noneconomic damages awards that are
at best a monetary approximation of the harm suffered. 5 3 Without some
level of speculation and heuristic value association that jurors take part in
every day, the need for jurors to decide such questions would be nonexistent.
The realm of punitive damages awards has garnered similar attention,
with critics arguing that juries produce unpredictable and arbitrary awards
that are not grounded by reason: "The absence of a rational pattern of
punitive damages awards supports arguments for their elimination or
limitation," 14 an argument very similar to denying recovery for less than

149. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-45(A) (2016) (mandating that medical professionals "must
not provide resuscitative measures" to a patient who has executed a do not resuscitate order).
150. See Oddi, supra note 7, at 642 ("[I]f the treatment . . undertaken in violation of the
right to [refuse treatment] is then negligently performed, and the patient dies as a consequence
of the negligent act, survival damages should be limited to .. .the period of survival.").
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-78-15(7) (2016).
152. Id. § 44-78-20(A)(2) (requiring the health care provider's record to contain the time,
date, and diagnoses giving rise to a patient's "terminal condition" status).
153. See 11 S.C. JUR. Damages § 20 (pain and suffering); id. § 21 (mental distress); id.
§ 23 (loss of enjoyment of life).
154. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 623, 624 (1997).
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readily ascertainable compensatory damages. However, a study conducted
using jury trial data from forty-five of the nation's most populous counties
over the course of one year led researchers to conclude that concern over the
unpredictability of jury awards is less warranted than commonly believed."I
The study suggests that largely discretionary punitive damages awards are
"one of the more explicable features of the legal system." 5 6 Juries may
therefore prove to be competent to award appropriate damages in a wrongful
living case, even when they have a range of discretion, though as Professor
Neil Vidmar, an authority on jury issues at Duke University School of Law,
puts it, "conventional wisdom is [that] juries are irresponsible, incompetent
and don't know how to make an assessment." 5 7
The Phillips court adeptly noted that precluding recovery because the
measure of damages is uncertain is often a fayade to further policy, not
logic. 158 No concrete justification supplies a basis for drawing this
"uncertainty" line where the courts have in cases discussed above, rendering
this line somewhat arbitrary, and as the Phillips court suggests, the true
rationale for rejecting the suits is likely based more on policy than
practicality. 159
1.

Birth defect litigation spurredby DES involves the same type of
damages analysis that the courts have condemned while
rejecting the wrongful life cause of action

The court in Phillips rejected the argument that the difficulty in
measuring damages suffered by a child in a wrongful life case should
preclude the action altogether. 160 In doing so, it referenced the contradiction
posed by DES litigation, wherein no such difficulty in measuring damages
has been considered.161 Because wrongful living damages consist of the
proximate harm caused by violating a patient's right to refuse treatment an
easier value to establish than the "utter void of nonexistence" contemplated
by wrongful life suits1 62-the
anecdotal analysis in Phillips is further

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See William Glaberson, A Study's Verdict: Jury Awards Are Not Out of Control,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/06/us/a-study-s-verdict-jury-aw
ards-are-not-out-of-control.html.
158. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542 (1980) (citing Capron, supra note
53, at 648).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 543 n.12.
162. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28 (1967).
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justification in support of the conclusion that difficulty in measuring
damages should not preclude recovery for wrongful living.
As the Phillips court describes, damages suffered by an infant in
pharmaceutically-induced birth defect cases is measured by the hypothetical
condition of the child had her mother not received the drugs at issue, less the
condition of the child as a result of her mother receiving those drugs.1 63 DES

litigation is unique in this class of cases, however, because it poses the same
exact hurdle that many wrongful life courts have considered an
insurmountable obstacle.
DES is administered to mothers to prevent the incidence of spontaneous
abortions in high-risk mothers.1 64 Therefore, the condition the plaintiff
would have been in without administration of DES could be non-existence,
and is therefore presumably a factor in determining the appropriate amount
of damages.1 65 Although it is merely a probability that the infant would not
have existed but for her mother taking DES, so it is that the mother in a
wrongful life action would have actually opted for an abortion if she had
been put on notice of a defect her child may be born with. Both categories of
litigation contain the same issue with regard to damages, yet it is
inexplicably determinative only with respect to wrongful life. The Phillips
court, noting the irony presented by DES litigation and the contrasting
wrongful life opinions, said that even though damages measurements in DES
litigation are "artificial and speculative," this barrier has "forestalled neither
the measurement nor cognition of damages in these cases."1 66 This
differential treatment is probative on the issue of whether policy was silently
creeping into the Willis court's purportedly practical reasoning.
The measurement of damages in wrongful life cases is also more remote
to the ken of the average juror than they are in wrongful living cases. Even
stipulating that no living person could be asked to associate a value with
never having been born, today's citizens and jurors can likely understand the
thought process that goes into executing a do not resuscitate order, and it is
likely that many potential jurors will be inclined to execute one
themselves.1 67 South Carolina should therefore be reticent to adopt the
rationale from wrongful life suits that difficulty in measuring damages
should preclude recovery for wrongful living, as the Ohio Court of Appeals
was inclined to do in Anderson.1 68

163.
164.
165.
166.

Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at 543 n.12.
See id.
See id.
Id.

167. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 197.

168. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
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The Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) economic analysis
method provides further insight into jurors' competency to
place an appropriatevalue on impairedlife versus death

The prevalence of economic analysis methods already employed by
governmental agencies 69 when making health care intervention program
decisions provides further insight into the public acceptance of the concept
that life lived with severe impairment may be worse than death. Further, data
collected points to the ability of citizens and jurors to attach value to
impaired health states versus death and may therefore award appropriate
damages in a wrongful living case. Although courts have claimed that life is
not a legal injury and that valuation problems might preclude recovery
altogether, these analysis methods tend to show that (a) society accepts that
continued life may be a net detriment, and (b) the amount of that detriment is
ascertainable.
The QALY method is employed to measure, in economic terms, the
value assigned to life as a function of duration and quality.' A QALY is
measured as the product of these two parameters, each of which is assigned
a numerical value between zero and one.' 7 ' For example, one year lived is
assigned a value of one, and a perfect health state for that year is assigned a
value of one, resulting in one QALY.1 72 Shorter durations of life or impaired
health states reduce this value accordingly. A difficulty emerges, however,
when attempting to provide proper values for various health states because
quality of life is inherently subjective, and different individuals may regard a
given quality of life with varying levels of preference. 173
To surmount this obstacle, researchers have gathered data from sample
groups in order to more accurately portray the quality parameter in the
QALY equation.1 74 The results of these surveys are consistent with this
Note's two major premises: that many people would prefer to end their life
than continue living under certain circumstances and are also capable of

169. Cost Effectiveness Analysis, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/dhdsp/programs/spha/economic_evaluation/docs/podcast v.pdf.
170. See Matthew D. Adler, QAL Ys and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE
J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 1 (2006).
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id.
173. See Trine S. Bergmo, Using QALYs in Telehealth Evaluations:A Systematic Review
of Methodology and Transparency, BMC HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 14:332 (2014); see
also Paul Dolan, Modeling Valuationsfor EuroQol Health States, 35 MED. CARE 1095, 1095
(1997) (discussing the similar economic analysis method of health-related quality of life
(HRQoL)).
174. Dolan, supra note 173, at 1095-96.
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assigning a numerical value to that preference.1 75 Surveyed individuals
reported that particular impaired health states received a value below zero,
meaning that death would be preferable to living any amount of time in that
health state.1 76

Though courts have claimed that jurors are incompetent to determine an
appropriate amount of damages in cases where the plaintiff would prefer to
be dead or to have never existed at all, the utilization of QALY analysis
shows that citizens are capable of assigning a fixed negative value to
continued life in certain health states. What is the overriding difference
between allowing jurors to assign a positive value to unimpaired continued
life, and allowing jurors to assign a negative value to continued life in cases
where the express wishes of the patient, if honored, would naturally result in
death? The courts' policy pronouncements regarding the sanctity and value
of all life, however impaired, provides the only conceivable justification for
categorically excluding value assessments on life that are below zero. Data
gathered from QALY studies, as well as the prevalence of patients who
attempt to exercise their autonomy rights under various end-of-life treatment
statutes, simply do not bear this out.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the very first wrongful life case suggested, 7 7 a thorough study of the
consequences of recognizing an action where life itself is the injury is still
being undertaken. The interests in favor of recognizing the tort of wrongful
living appear, however, to significantly outweigh the justifications that
courts have provided for rejecting it in the past.
This Note makes no contention that life is not precious, or that those
suffering would be better off dead. To the contrary, recognition of the
wrongful living tort simply acknowledges that part of life's sanctity and
preciousness is the ability to live with the maximum freedom of choice
already afforded to citizens by law. The premise of this Note stands on the
unassailable presence of the right to be free from unwanted medical
treatment, even when that decision results in death. South Carolina already
recognizes that receiving treatment may serve only to prolong suffering,
with no medical benefit. Continued life after the violation of a do not
resuscitate order should therefore be considered a legal injury, and an injury

175. Bergmo, supra note 173 ("It is possible to be in a health state worse than death with
a negative quality index."); Dolan, supra note 173, at 1099 (noting numerous survey responses
evidencing preference for death over certain health states).
176. See Bergmo, supra note 173, at 4-5.
177. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
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that should be accompanied by an appropriate remedy in South Carolina's
civil justice system.
The difficulty in measuring a wrongful living plaintiff s damages is also
unavailing, considering the widespread understanding that more years of life
is not always preferable and that many people undergo the cost-benefit
analysis of executing a do not resuscitate order each year.
The weighing of policy and practicality interests is certainly not easy,
but South Carolina nonetheless should be ready to vindicate those whose
right of self-determination has been violated.
Curtis J. Copeland

Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

31

*

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 9

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss4/9

32

